This paper investigates the effects of organizational form on problemistic search. We contrast how Indian firms affiliated to business groups and unaffiliated firms evaluate performance and react by adjusting their internal technology search and external market search. We propose that, compared with unaffiliated firms, business group firms are more externally oriented in setting aspiration levels and more likely to respond to low performance in the market domain. We find support for an external orientation of business group affiliated firms and find that group affiliation determines the responsiveness to performance feedback in different search domains. The findings suggest a need to add considerations of organizational form and governance to the theory of organizational search.
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Organizational responsiveness to performance is an important mechanism of adaptation in learning theories building on the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March 1963 ; Levitt and March 1988; Schulz 2002) . This theory predicts that organizational performance below the aspiration level will trigger problemistic search and organizational change, and has found support in studies of R&D consortia of high-tech firms (Bolton 1993) , format changes in radio stations (Greve 1998) , innovations and investment in shipbuilding (Greve 2003a (Greve , 2003b , syndicate composition in investment banks (Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, and Chuang 2005) , and research and development expenses of manufacturing firms (Chen and Miller 2007; Chen 2008) . However, there is still a need for research examining whether problemistic search is affected by how the focal organization is embedded in an organizational and environmental context (Gavetti, Levinthal, and Ocasio 2007) .
We address this question by contrasting the problemistic search of two organizational forms in India -business group firms versus unaffiliated firms. Business groups are sets of legally independent firms linked by formal and informal network ties (Khanna and Palepu 1999; Khanna and Rivkin 2001; Lincoln and Gerlach 2004; Chang, Chung, and Mahmood 2006) . Business groups are a common organizational form in developing economies, in part because they act as functional substitutes for poorly developed institutions such as capital and labor markets, and may be better than the capital market in imposing performance pressures (Khanna 2000) . For example, Khanna and Yafeh (2005) show data from 12 emerging markets indicating a significant presence of business groups in each as measured by the number of affiliated firms, and an even greater presence when taking into account the greater average size of business group affiliates in each market (except Turkey).
Two features of Indian business groups matter for their problemistic search. First, they are network forms of organizations where social influence is directed among affiliate firms whose dominant coalitions are members of an extended family (Encarnation 1989) . Second, although business groups in India span diverse industries, each affiliated firm usually operates in a single industry. Hence, each firm in an Indian business group has comparable scope of business to an independent firm, but its business group affiliation embeds it in a different governing and social environment. Below we argue that this structural embeddedness makes business group member firms more externally oriented in their focus of attention and more responsive to external comparisons of performance than unaffiliated firms. This difference is an opportunity to test how attention and decision making are affected by the organizational structure (Ocasio 1997) .
We also investigate whether the problemistic search of these organizational forms takes a different direction as a result of their environmental embeddedness. Business group affiliates tend to be well-established firms with a long history.
1 They have greater market dominance than unaffiliated firms and a history of addressing performance problems through maintenance of their dominant market position. Thus, large business group member firms adjust their market search in response to performance, and this reaction to low performance is seen in smaller business group firms as well as a result of transfer learning (Baum and Ingram 1998) within the business group. Unaffiliated firms have weaker market positions, suggesting a strategy of searching through research and development to overcome the dominance of the business group affiliates. This difference is an opportunity to test the effect of imprinting and transfer of routines (Stinchcombe 1965 ).
Finally, we examine the effect of business group affiliation on organizational inertia.
Another effect of business group affiliation is that the tension between the forces of change and inertia described in the classical theory of inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1977) has a different set of participants. The family controlling the group oversees a number of distinct businesses, and may act like activist shareholders who press for change in underperforming 1 The average business group affiliated firm in our dataset was 32 years old with annual revenues of 1.7 billion Indian Rupees while the average unaffiliated firm was 22 years old with annual revenues of 300 million Indian Rupees.
businesses. In contexts with weak shareholder power, as in India and many other developing economies, they are a source of concentrated power that can spur change in firms that may otherwise be inert.
Indian business group and independent firms are a novel context for examining problemistic search, making this investigation an early exploration of phenomena better known in developed-economy contexts. However, the theoretical stakes are still significant.
The theory of problemistic search makes general claims and is built on ideas of goal oriented organizational behavior that ought to have broad applicability across contexts. The differences between business group affiliate firms and unaffiliated firms proposed here follow naturally from a set of general ideas of social embeddedness and layered organizational governance. Thus, although we explore a new context, we also give specific hypotheses and theoretical rationales.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Search Theory
Organizational learning theory examines how organizations learn "by encoding inferences from history into routines that guide behavior" (Levitt and March 1988: 320) .
Learning theory is a rapidly growing part of management research (Miner and Mezias 1996; Schulz 2002; Argote and Greve 2007) , and has made progress by discovering systematic relations between organizational experience and behavioral changes. Central in the intellectual foundation for this research is Cyert and March (1963) , who introduced the theory of problemistic search. Problemistic search is "search that is stimulated by a problem (usually a rather specific one) and directed toward finding a solution to that problem" (Cyert and March 1963:121 ). An organization engages in problemistic search as a result of obtaining performance below an aspiration level that is based on its own experience and that of other organizations (Cyert and March 1963: 123) . This search pattern occurs because organizational goals are set as aspiration levels of performance that are acceptable to central constituencies for the organization, so in order to satisfy their constituencies managers shift attention among goal variables according to the performance relative to the aspiration level.
For example, owners seek high returns on assets, and in response managers pursue a level of performance that indicates satisfactory returns. Failure to reach the aspiration level will cause search for actions that may raise the performance, while success causes attention to goals favored by other constituencies.
Because search is oriented towards an expedient solution to the problem, organizations search for solutions in the proximity of the perceived problem and the status quo (Cyert and March 1963: 120-123) . The most immediate result, then, is incremental adjustment of practices thought to be causally related to the problem. However, the theory also specifies that organizational search is made wider when initial solutions are not seen to work. Consistent with this view, organizations with performance below aspiration levels have been shown to engage in major initiatives, sometimes after first trying out smaller changes (Grinyer and McKiernan 1990) . Thus, the basic prediction is that organizational performance below the aspiration level increases problemistic search, which in turn can lead to incremental or larger organizational changes.
Organizational Form and Search
The theory of problemistic search can be made more precise by considering how different actions come to be seen as more or less proximate to a problem of low performance.
It has long been recognized that organizational decision makers do not freely pick which problems to address and solutions to apply, but are instead affected by the organizational structure (March and Simon 1958) , the flow of issues presented to the organization (Barnard 1938) , and the interaction of these two (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972) . Some models that integrate these influences suggest that the decision making becomes highly unstable because the limited organizational capacity to process multiple issues simultaneously creates competition for attention among issues (Cohen et al., 1972) .
One approach to predicting the selection of solutions is to consider how organizational attention is ordered because managers (1) are situated in a stable organizational structure of procedures and communication channels and (2) are affected by the organizational environment (Ocasio 1997) . Conceptually, the organization can be thought of as a system of procedures and communication channels that receives issues from the environment, feeds these to decision makers, and retrieves candidate answers from the environment. This process is guided by attention structures and results in organizational moves such as search or change decisions (Ocasio 1997) . The attention structures, in turn, are produced by the organizational experiences and structural context.
For organizations that are affiliated with other organizations through ownership ties (such as a division), network ties (such as business group member), or genealogical ties (such as a spin-off), other organizations are an important part of the environment. The focal organization can draw on other organizations for ready-made answers to problems, routines for search, and patterns of attention (Ingram and Baum 1997; Ingram 1998, 2002; Banaszak-Holl, Mitchell, Baum and Berta 2006) . Mobility of personnel among organizations can cause such transfers of knowledge (Rao and Drazin 1998) , and so does communication among their managers (Ingram and Baum 1997) . Knowledge transfers let the focal organization learn quickly, but also reduce experimentation that might have led to closer match of attention patterns and environmental conditions (Lounamaa and March 1987) . For spin-off firms, there is evidence that transfer of knowledge from the parent occurs and affects behaviors and survival (Phillips 2002 (Phillips , 2005 . For business groups, historical data suggest transfers from the group to individual firms (e.g., Fruin 1992) . Hence, an organization may draw on the experience of affiliated organizations when selecting the responses to a given problem.
Business Groups Affiliation and Focus of Attention
Business groups are a prominent form of interfirm affiliation in many economies in the world (Khanna and Yafeh 2005) . Although this organizational form is not unique to developing economies, and indeed is prevalent in developed countries such as Japan (Aoki and Patrick 1994; Lincoln and Gerlach 2004) , business groups are especially common in environments characterized by poor or missing institutions that support the efficient functioning of markets (Guillen 2000 , Keister 1998 Khanna and Palepu 1999; Peng and Delios 2006) . Researchers have emphasized three features that differentiate business group affiliated firms from unaffiliated ones. First, affiliated firms are subject to a network form of governance since business groups have multiple axes of social solidarity such as kinship, ethnicity or religion (Granovetter 1995) . These axes create relational and structural embeddedness of member firms' dominant coalitions, thereby engendering the trust required for economic transactions to occur and collegial advice to be heeded (Chang et al. 2006; Khanna and Rivkin 2006) . Second, an affiliated firm's interests are often subordinated to the interests of its group through hierarchical structures provided by a central authority -akin to authority structures experienced by a focal unit within a multi-unit firm. This central authority can be a bank (Fruin 1992) or an industrial firm (Leff 1978) . Third, although an affiliated firm need not be diversified, the business group as a whole usually operates in multiple industries. The primary reason is that business groups gain economies of scope by deploying valuable resources such as scarce managerial talent or preferential access to capital across product markets (Khanna and Palepue 2000; Leff 1978) . In essence, business groups can be conceptualized as inter-firm networks that contain features of both markets and hierarchies. Such intermediate governance structures have the information and resource sharing of hierarchies and some of the governance properties of markets, and resemble mixed governance structures seen in the developed world as well (Ouchi 1980; Bradach and Eccles 1989) .
Despite the scholarly consensus that business groups represent a distinct organizational form, there is substantial cross-country variation in the definition of a business group. Specifically in the Indian context, the notion that business groups are a distinct economic actor is evident in the work of policymakers as well as scholars. Thus, Hazari's (1966) influential study on the market power exercised by groups makes a distinction between group-affiliated companies and unaffiliated ones by defining a group as the 'area over which a decision making authority holds sway' (Hazari 1966: 7) . The term 'area' referred to multiple legally independent joint-stock companies while 'decision making authority' referred to the extended family that controlled a given group. Subsequent work by policy makers (e.g. Dutt 1969) showed that control was usually exercised through non-equity channels such as family relationships or board memberships. Encarnation (1989:45) provides a rich description of this type of control when he notes that in Indian business groups "strong social ties of family, caste, religion, language, ethnicity and region reinforced financial and organizational linkages among affiliated enterprises". More recent research (e.g. Khanna and Palepu 2004) suggests that the business group organizational form has persisted even after economic reforms in the Indian economy, indicating that group-affiliation (or lack of it) is an important and enduring governance feature of private sector firms in India.
In summary, Indian business group affiliated firms differ from unaffiliated ones in the three ways suggested by the literature. Indian business group firms are subject to network governance as well as hierarchical authority; additionally, though a focal business group is usually diversified across industries, its constituent affiliated firms operate in a single industry. The causal mechanisms we specify to develop our hypotheses below on how business group affiliation influences problemistic search invoke these three theoretically derived features to varying degrees. However, our analysis should be considered exploratory since data constraints prevent us from distinguishing which of these three features of business group affiliation is driving the effects we observe.
Because of their organizational form, affiliates of business groups face closer and more comparative evaluation of their performance than unaffiliated firms do (Encarnation 1989; Khanna and Palepu 2000 
Business Group Affiliation and Search Domain
The business groups we study are located in a developing economy, however, and thus we also need to consider how this context may influence the firm search. This question is interesting because organizations not only choose when to search, but also where to search.
Organizational search can be conducted in both the market domain and the technology domain (Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001) . Organizational search in the market domain is conducted by adding products to obtain a wider market position or adding customers to get a deeper market penetration. Both forms of search involve greater resource use of marketing, sales, and promotion because it is much more expensive to initiate new customer relationships than to maintain existing ones (Mantrala 2002; Reinartz, Thomas and Kumar 2005) . If the search is successful and a more profitable market position has been found, then the marketing expenses relative to sales will decline as the firm switches its focus back on maintaining existing customer relationships.
Firms in developing economies face an environment in which factors such as lower income and literacy levels result in slower product diffusion and lower final penetration than in developed nations (Talukdar, Sudhir, and Ainslie 2002) . Such conditions increase the firm's dependence on marketing volume and approach for its sales penetration, and make marketing a likely target of management attention when the firm's performance is below the aspiration level. However, the prediction also depends on the firm's position in the market. A firm with a high market share is likely to have experienced that market entry and extension actions are effective, and thus to have such actions embedded as routine responses to problems. Thus, one would expect such firms to respond to low performance by increasing marketing expenses regardless of whether they are affiliated with a business group or not.
However, attention patterns are transferred from related organizations, which will cause greater attention to marketing even in small business group affiliates. Transfer of routines among corporate siblings is frequently observed (e.g., Darr and Argote 1995; Greve 1996; Ingram and Baum 1997) , and occurs even in contexts in which these routines are less effective (Baum and Ingram 1998; Greve 1999) . Thus, a routine of paying attention to marketing that is consistent with the experiences of most members in a business group can be transferred also to business group members in which this pattern is less effective. Conversely, unaffiliated firms lack the group influence that leads to such routine transfers, and are instead susceptible to imprinting from their early experiences (e.g., Stinchcombe 1965) . Large unaffiliated firms may have imprinted attention patterns from their origins as smaller firms, which could be in any action domain rather than exclusively in marketing. Thus, although market actions are just as likely to benefit large unaffiliated firms as large affiliated firms, they are less likely to have routinized them. Also, the closer scrutiny of performance that business group members experience may drive their search toward actions that can lead to quick improvements. Although market and technology search both have effects in both the short and long term, managers may see market search as a quicker route to improved performance given the long lead times common in R&D. It follows that market search intensity is more affected by performance in firms affiliated with business groups:
H2: The market search intensity of a BG affiliated firm is more responsive to the firm's performance relative to aspirations than that of an unaffiliated firm.
R&D intensity is adjusted in response to performance across a wide range of industries in developed economies (Antonelli 1989; Chen and Miller 2007; Chen 2008) . This is because search through R&D can solve performance problems stemming from outdated product lines, and the risk of product line obsolescence is high in developed economies as a result of the high competition and frequent use of technological advances as competitive weapons. Developing economy firms face a different situation, as they can often make faster and more predictable technological progress by licensing technologies from more advanced firms. So, it is not obvious that internal R&D search is the natural response of a developing economy firm that has performance problems. Below we argue that organizational form influences this adaptive behavior.
There are two mechanisms through which unaffiliated firms adjust their R&D search intensity more than business group affiliated firms as a response to poor performance. First, when compared to business group affiliated firms, decision makers of unaffiliated firms have fewer levers to pull in response to poor performance. They operate in a single market, typically as a follower, and hence are likely to have had less than satisfying experiences with market search as an antidote to poor performance. This makes internal R&D search more salient to decision makers of unaffiliated firms as a response to poor performance. The saliency of R&D search is increased by the high uncertainty of internal R&D search outcomes relative to market search outcomes. Before completion, R&D projects yield partial and ambiguous outcome feedback that decision makers have to interpret as either promising or discouraging in order to decide the continuation of the project (Garud and Rappa 1994) .
Hence a firm that has committed to R&D search can easily continue. The tendency to increase commitment to highly uncertain projects is especially strong when there is little external oversight of the managers responsible for initiating the project (Staw and Ross 1987) , as is the case in unaffiliated firms. So, in response to poor performance, unaffiliated firms are more likely to respond with an increase in their R&D search intensity. BG affiliated firms, on the other hand, will have marketing as a more salient area of attention, and will thus be less likely to adjust R&D expenditures in response to low performance.
A second mechanism is the effect of performance pressures. As outlined earlier, affiliates of business groups face closer and more comparative evaluation of their performance than unaffiliated firms do. One consequence of this performance pressure is for managers of business group affiliated firms to focus on more immediate and less noisy 'fixes' for poor performance. In other words, affiliated firms' managers have greater incentives to look for low hanging fruit as a response to poor performance, and thus focus on market search as being more likely to bear immediate results than the more uncertain and noisier internal R&D search. Hence we predict:
H3: The internal technology search (R&D intensity) of a BG affiliated firm is less
responsive to the firm's performance relative to aspirations than that of an unaffiliated firm.
Search and Organizational Inertia
Next, we consider the effects of the business group structure on the strength of responses to low performance. It has been argued that when organizations become large and diversified, they are subject to inertial forces that make change difficult (Barnett and Freeman 2001; Hannan and Freeman 1984) . This argument is based on two lines of reasoning. First, large scale results in greater organizational complexity, which increases the likelihood that organizational subgroups will have the ability to resist changes that alter power relations (Hannan and Freeman 1977) . Second, when higher diversity of activities is combined with attempts to coordinate the activities in order to reap economies of scope, then the organization has cross-cutting interdependencies that make it likely that changes in one area will necessitate changes elsewhere, making change more costly than in a less interdependent organization (Barnett and Freeman 2001) . Hence, if the search results in proposals for change that will be resisted politically or be expensive to implement, the results cannot be used in the organization. The value of search is reduced because it is less likely that the organization can use the results.
The fragmentation of business groups into several single-business firms keeps each firm much smaller than the business group as a whole, and the influence from other member firms counteract the internal inertia of each firm (Lincoln, Gerlach, and Ahmadjian 1996; Khanna and Palepu 1999) . Business group influence on affiliate firms can take the form of direct intervention to improve low-performing firms in some contexts such as Japan (Lincoln et al. 1996) . While such direct intervention may be rare, business group affiliates are also influenced by peer firms through other mechanisms. Network ties among managers of affiliate firms cause judgments of the acceptability of a certain performance level to spread through interpersonal influence processes (e.g., Erickson 1988) . Their shared role as affiliate managers and the shared dependence on ownership families and other group investors for firm capital and personal careers produce competitive relations (Burt 1992) , which again trigger improvement attempts. Finally, affiliates share information on their routines and innovations, causing specific actions to be imitated (Greve 1996; Baum and Ingram 1998 
METHODS
We test our hypotheses on a high quality data set containing the full population of publicly listed firms in India drawn from PROWESS, a publicly available database, for the We created our dataset as follows. From the full PROWESS database (77,739 firm-years in total), we first dropped 6,800 firm-years (8.7%) of data on firms that were government owned since their behavior is likely governed by non-economic considerations. We then dropped 7,903 (10.2%) firm-years where net worth was negative or zero because these are bankrupt firms, which are not operating but remain as legal entities because of legal restrictions on firm dissolution in India. From the remaining 63,036 firm-years of data, we dropped 293 observations where firm ROA (operating profits / capital employed) was more than 4 standard deviations from the mean, 294 observations where the absolute value of slack (working capital as a percent of sales) was more than 100 and 74 observations where the absolute value of the debt to equity ratio was more than 100. We did this because these observations are likely to be database errors or unusual outliers. We then dropped 4,260
observations from firms that were subsidiaries of multi-national companies and 539
observations from firms that were cooperatives or jointly owned by private and government entities, as these observations do not belong to the two organizational form of interest to our investigation. This led to a final data set with 23,970 observations from firms affiliated with Indian business groups and 33,606 from firms that were unaffiliated to business groups.
Dependent Variables
The two dependent variables are market search intensity and R&D intensity. Drawing on prior research (e.g. Chen and Miller 2007) , we measured R&D intensity of the focal firm for each year as the ratio of total R&D expenses to revenues.
There is little prior work that examines market search intensity. Analogous to our measure of R&D intensity, we obtained our measure of market search intensity as follows.
For each firm, we first added the advertising, marketing, and distribution expenses incurred during an accounting period. We then expressed this summed expense as a percentage of sales revenues to obtain our measure of market search intensity. Advertising expenses include costs incurred for advertising and sales promotion. Marketing expenses include rebates, discounts, commissions paid to selling agents and all other marketing related costs. Finally, distribution expenses reflect expenses incurred by firms on distribution of goods and services.
We thus adopt a formative indicator approach in measuring market search intensity. Fornell and Bookstein (1982:292) (emphasis in the original) illustrate the difference between formative and reflective constructs as follows: "constructs such as 'personality' or 'attitude' are typically viewed as underlying factors that give rise to something that is observed. Their indicators tend to be realized, then as reflective. On the other hand, when constructs are conceived as explanatory combinations of indicators (such as 'population change' or 'marketing mix') that are determined by a combination of variables, their indicators should be formative". The three variables -advertising expenses, marketing expenses and distribution expenses -that we combined are moderately correlated in our data. Specifically, the correlations were 0.41, 0.26 and 0.43 respectively. We also estimated models in which we eliminated distribution expenses from this variable, and found that this weakened the estimated effects, as distribution constitutes a significant proportion of all marketing expenses.
Modeling Approach
We model search as a 2-stage process in which firms first choose whether to engage in search and subsequently examine how much to search. This is a cautious approach because of the possibility that the determinants of search choice and search intensity may be different, but correlated, which is captured through a Heckman selectivity model. Specifically, we want to control for the possibility that industry and firm type effects on the selection of search are correlated with the search intensity, which is not possible in a single-stage model because our modeling approach factors out firm effects (and thus also industry and firm type effects) from the search intensity regression. Our theoretical preference for treating the search decision structure as a two stage one is also consistent with our conversations with Indian managers on their decision process for technology search.
We estimated a panel logit equation for the selection model and then estimated an Arellano-Bond linear, dynamic panel estimation equation for the second stage (Arellano and Bond 1991) . In the selection model, the dependent variable takes the value one if the firm has a nonzero value on the focal search intensity and a value of zero otherwise. We estimated a random effects panel logit selection model on the full sample of firms for the resulting three dependent variables, and introduced the inverse Mills ratio calculated from this first-stage model as a pre-determined variable in the Arellano-Bond model in order to control for the selectivity effect.
Allocation of resources is often a routinized and continuous activity in organizations (Bromiley 1986; Greve 2003a; Chen and Miller 2007) . Including the lagged search variable can greatly reduce the threat of spuriousness and reverse causation (Allison 1990) . Through a first-differencing approach with instrumental variables, the Arellano-Bond estimator jointly controls for firm effects and autoregression that may influence search intensity over time (Arellano and Bond 1991) . We estimated equations (1) and (2) for the second stage estimation models. This model was estimated only for firms with non-zero dependent variables.
MKT it is coded as the market search intensity (total marketing expenses divided by sales) of firm i in year t. The firm-years where MKT it is 0 are not included since in those cases, the focal firm did not engage in market search. R &D is similarly coded in equation
(2). W 1it is a vector of strictly exogenous explanatory variables while W 2it-1 is a vector of predetermined explanatory variables. The lagged dependent variable is also included on the right hand side to model the period to period persistence of search activities. Overall, our model controls for unobserved heterogeneity, autocorrelation, and reverse causation.
Independent Variables
Selection model
Our first set of independent variables for the selection model concerned firm characteristics. We measured firm age from the date of incorporation of the company. Firm age was incremented each year for the focal firm during the study period. Slack resources allow experimentation and organizational change (Cyert and March 1963; March 1981) , and indeed previous studies suggest that organizational slack influences search expenditures (Greve 2003b; Chen and Miller 2007) . We measured firm slack as the ratio of working capital to sales (Miller and Chen 2004; Singh 1986 ). We measured firm size as the logarithm of millions of rupees of sales revenues during the year. We measured ROA as the ratio of operating profits to capital employed. We used operating profits in order to minimize accounting distortions caused by accounting rules.
Next, we set the business group (BG) indicator variable to 1 for firms affiliated to a Business Group and 0 otherwise. The PROWESS database uniquely identifies a firm to an ownership group, which enables us to code this variable. Firms in the PROWESS database are assigned to business groups based on a combination of individual company announcements regarding their group membership as well as assessments by informed
insiders. This classification of firms by PROWESS has been used by most researchers studying Indian business groups (e.g. Khanna and Palepu 1999; Chacar and Vissa 2005) . For BG firms we measure BG size as the logarithm of millions of rupees of sales revenues for the business group during the year. We controlled for year and industry effects at the 2 digit SIC code level using indicator variables. Finally, we controlled for industry size using the count of the number of firms in each 3-digit industry. We used lagged values of the time-varying independent variables.
Search Model Pre-determined independent variables
Performance against aspirations. Performance was measured through return on assets (ROA), an important measure for managerial performance evaluation that is not affected by the financial leverage of the firm (as return on equity is). It is the preferred measure in work on performance effects on organizational change, risk taking, and search (Bromiley 1991; Chen 2008; Ferrier 2001; Lant, et al. 1992; Miller and Chen 2004; Wiseman and Bromiley 1996 ).
We specify the aspiration level (A) as a mixture of external and internal (i.e. historical)
influences (Cyert and March 1963: 123) . For BG affiliates, we specify two external sources of aspiration: the median of all other firms in the same industry (IA) and the median of all other firms in the business group (GA). The historical aspiration (HA) is an exponentially weighted average of previous performance levels of the same firm. Letting i, g, and h be weights, the formulae are:
A tk = iIA tk + gGA tk + (1-i -g)HA tk (4)
Here, t is a time subscript and k is a firm subscript. The weights were estimated by a grid search (Greene 1993: 344) over all parameter values in increments of 0.1, taking the combination giving the best model fit (using a Wald test). We report the weights used in each model in the tables that report the search intensity results. For unaffiliated firms, there is no group aspiration level, so only the industry and historical aspiration levels are used. The grid search method we followed to identify the best fit model parameters for the focus of attention of firms does not lend itself to straight forward statistical testing, since the models are nonnested. Hence, we test our focus of attention argument (Hypotheses 1) using a counter-factual testing approach that is described below.
First for each organizational form (Business Group and Unaffiliated), we estimated performance against optimal aspirations for that organizational form as determined by the grid search technique. We then created a 'counterfactual' variable that equals performance against aspirations, but uses the optimal parameters for the aspiration level of the other organizational form. The counterfactual variable thus estimates performance against an aspiration level that was a potential alternative but was not actually used. Making such a variable is straightforward for the business group firms, but for the unaffiliated firms one adjustment was necessary. Because they do not have any business group affiliate firms, the counterfactual variable for them added the business group and industry weights and applied the sum weight to the industry average performance. We then introduced both variables into the regression model. Our prediction on focus of attention would be supported if performance against optimal aspirations is statistically significant but the counterfactual variable is not.
For estimating the aspiration level, we used the PROWESS assignment of each firm to a specific ownership code (which uniquely identifies a business group) and to a specific industry code (which uniquely identifies a 3-digit SIC equivalent industry). Firms whose revenues are drawn from a number of different industries, are assigned to a specific industry code (labeled 'diversified'). We dropped these diversified firms from the analysis because it is not clear which other firms they might be paying attention to, and hence their social aspiration level is undefined. There were only 663 such firm-years in the data.
We used firm size and firm slack as predetermined variables with the same definition as in the selectivity analysis. We measured the debt/equity ratio to control for financial leverage and used the lagged value as a predetermined variable. We calculated the inverse Mills ratio from the predicted values of the first stage selection model using Lee's (1979) formula. Again we measure BG size as the logarithm of millions of rupees of sales revenues for the business group during the year. We do not enter firm age into this analysis because age effects cannot be identified in a model with first-differencing of variables, as in the Arellano-Bond model. Similarly, all effects of time-constant firm or group characteristics are controlled through the first differencing rather than estimated explicitly. group members is more likely to be clearly observable for the largest business groups rather than the small ones. Second, the observed distribution of business group size in our sample was significantly right-skewed, again emphasizing the usefulness of examining the largest business groups. We get similar results when we run models using a simple interaction effect between business group size (logged) and performance against aspirations.
Exogenous independent variables
Industry search intensity. We controlled for institutionalized search practices in the industry in which the focal firm operates by including the contemporaneous median search intensity for the focal variable in the industry as a control.
Import duties.
To control for competitive pressures that might drive firm search directly, we controlled for the import duties in 3 digit industries obtained from World Bank data. We were able to secure industry-level import tariff data for the following years : 1990, 1992, 1993, 1997 and 1999 . We carried forward the duty structures for the missing years of data. In addition, since import duties are not applicable to non-tradable sectors, such as retail services, construction related activities etc., we set the import duty to 0 for such sectors.
Year indicators. We also controlled for year effects by using indicator variables for all the years in our study period.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics for the selection model is shown in Table 1A . As can be seen, the correlation coefficients are small, although market search intensity is moderately correlated with firm age (0.52) and industry size (-0.55) and BG size is correlated with the BG dummy (0.72). The descriptive statistics for the second stage search intensity models are shown in Tables 1B and 1C . Again correlation coefficients are small, except for the correlation between BG size and firm size (0.54) and R&D search intensity and firm slack (0.61). Overall, we conclude that multi-collinearity is not a concern. Table 1A to Table 1C about Table 2 reports the results of the selection model on firms' decision to engage in market search and R&D search. Large firm size, slack resources as well as firm age increases both search activities. Compared to unaffiliated firms, it seems that affiliation to a BG increases the likelihood of engaging in market search but does not affect the likelihood of engaging in R&D search. In addition, greater BG size decreases the chances of engaging in market search but increases R&D search. Finally, some of the year and industry indicator variables (not displayed) are significant, suggesting that time and industry effects also matter.
------------------------------------------------Insert
here ------------------------------------------------
Decision to engage in search -first stage selection model
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Focus of Attention in Setting Aspirations
Tables 3 and 4 report the results of the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimation for market search intensity and R&D search intensity respectively for the pooled sample of BG affiliated and unaffiliated firms. In each table, model 1 reports the base model while subsequent models test specific hypotheses. The first rows of these two tables report the point estimate of the optimal parameter combinations for BG and unaffiliated firms respectively. As can be seen from Table 3 , for market search intensity, business group affiliated firms are externally focused while setting aspirations because historical performance has a weight of only 0.5, with industry median performance (0.3) and business group median performance (0.2) contributing half of the aspiration level in total. In contrast, unaffiliated firms are internally focused because the historical performance has a weight of 1.0 in the aspiration level for market search intensity.
In the next model we introduce the counterfactual performance variable formed by swapping the aspiration weights of the two organizational forms. In order to focus the analysis of how these two variables differ, we orthogonalized them, and introduced them as predictors into the regression models for market search intensity and R&D search intensity.
H1 would be supported if performance against aspiration is significant but performance against counterfactual aspirations is not. Model 2 of Table 3 and Table 4 respectively reports these results for market search intensity and R&D search intensity. As can be seen from Model 2 of Table 3 , the coefficient of performance against aspirations is significant while performance against counterfactual aspiration is not significant. This supports the claim that BG affiliated firms are more externally oriented in setting aspirations in the market search domain. However, in Model 2 of Table 4 both performance against aspiration and performance against counterfactual aspiration are significant predictors of R&D search intensity. This is against expectations, and means that we are not completely confident that the difference between BG affiliated and unaffiliated firms' focus of attention is significant in all search domains. Also, as the first row of Table 4 makes clear, both BG affiliated and unaffiliated firms seem to have an internal focus of attention in the R&D search domain, so their aspiration levels differ only in the speed of adjusting to performance -BG affiliated firms adapt their aspiration levels faster. Overall, we conclude that unaffiliated firms rely exclusively on an internal focus of attention, whereas BG affiliated firms have an external focus in setting aspirations in the market domain and an internal one in the R&D domain.
Drivers of Search Intensity
Performance against aspirations (P~A) is negative and significant in the base model (model 1) of Tables 3 and 4, suggesting that Indian firms' market search and R&D search response to performance feedback is consistent with theory on problemistic search as well as prior empirical research in other contexts. We now test our predictions on how BG affiliation and search behavior adds to this base model. Model 3 of Table 3 examines whether BG affiliated firms are more responsive to performance feedback in the market domain. About 49% of the observations in the sample were coded as BG affiliated. As can be seen, the interaction of performance against aspirations and BG affiliated firm is negative and significant while the main effect of performance against aspirations is not significant. Hence, BG affiliated firms were more responsive than unaffiliated firms in the market domain, strongly supporting H2. Table 4 reports the drivers of R&D intensity. Model 3 examines whether BG affiliated firms respond differently from unaffiliated firms in the R&D domain. About 72% of the observations in the sample were coded as BG affiliated. As can be seen, the main effect of performance against aspirations is negative and significant while the interaction of performance against aspirations and business group affiliate is positive and significant, showing that unaffiliated firms are more likely than BG affiliated firms to increase R&D search intensity in response to poor performance. H3 thus receives strong support. Table 3 examines whether firms affiliated to large business groups are systematically different in their responsiveness in the market search domain when compared to firms affiliated to small business groups. The omitted (base) category in this model is the unaffiliated firm. The coefficient of P~A X large-BG affiliated firm dummy is -0.064 and significant while P~A X small-BG affiliated firm dummy is -0.009 and is not significant. A chi-square test rejects the equality of the two coefficients (p=0.001), thus providing evidence that firms affiliated to large business groups are more responsive to poor performance than firms affiliated to small business groups in the market domain. This finding provides support for H4 in the market domain. Figures 1A and 1B present the interaction effects graphically for performance aspiration ranging within three standard deviations in the sample. Table 4 examines whether firms affiliated to large business groups are systematically different in their responsiveness in the R&D domain when compared to firms affiliated to small business groups. The omitted category in this model is again, the unaffiliated firm. As can be seen, the coefficient of P~A X large-BG affiliated firm dummy is +0.034 and significant while P~A X small-BG affiliated firm dummy is +0.022 and is not significant. A chi-square test is unable to reject the equality of these two coefficients (p=0.37).
Model 4 of
Our analysis thus fails to support the business group size effect predicted by H4 in the R&D search domain.
All the models control for the lagged dependent variable, industry and period effects.
Contemporaneous industry average search intensity has positive and significant relations with firm search in all of our models, suggesting the importance of including this control variable for controlling for industry effects on search patterns. Firm size and firm slack had significant negative effects on R&D search intensity but did not impact market search intensity. BG size had a significant positive effect on market search intensity but did not impact R&D search intensity. The non-significance of the coefficient estimates for the lagged R&D suggests no significant persistence in this spending from year to year. The year indicator variables (not displayed) are often significant for R&D, indicating time-varying macro-environmental influences on technological investment across all industries and firms. For marketing expenses, the yearly control variables are not significant. Other control variables do not show significant effects across all models.
We conducted a number of robustness tests to test our conclusions. First, we were curious about how important the aspiration level was for our conclusions. When searching for the optimal aspiration level we found that many parameter combinations with lower fit than those displayed in Table 3 and Table 4 produced similar findings, so the findings appear robust to the choice of aspiration level. Second, we performed a supplementary analysis of business group affiliates using ROA without any aspiration-level adjustment, which gave qualitatively similar results as the models with aspiration levels. Third, we examined if search activity varies significantly above and below the aspiration level by modeling a spline specification; we found that a linear specification provided a more parsimonious description of the phenomenon. Fourth, we wanted to know if our results on BG firms' behavior are still relevant as the Indian economy evolves towards greater openness. To examine this, we split our sample into two periods -pre 1997 and post 1997. We picked this year because it represented a shift from a higher import duty regime (pre 1997) to a lower one (post 1997).
We found stronger results for the lower import duty regime, suggesting that increased competitive pressures led to greater responsiveness to performance feedback. Fifth, to check if our results were driven by sector differences in accounting rules, we estimated our models on a sub-sample of manufacturing firms and obtained identical results as the full sample.
Finally, we wanted to know if our results were robust to our modeling approach. To examine this, we re-ran the analysis with a panel Tobit specification and obtained a qualitatively similar pattern of results.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We summarize our key results as follows: First, we find that depending on their organizational form, Indian firms' vary in their focus of attention while setting aspirations.
Firms unaffiliated to business groups rely exclusively on internal (i.e. historical) performance in setting aspirations. Business group affiliates are more externally focused while setting aspirations for market search, but like unaffiliated firms they show an internal focus for R&D search. Second, we find that organizational form affects a firm's responsiveness to performance feedback differently depending on the domain of search. As we predicted, business group affiliates were more responsive in the market domain, while unaffiliated firms were more responsive in technology domain. Overall the effect of performance feedback on the search behaviour of Indian firms is similar to that in developed economies -the context of much prior research. However, our investigation used the business group organizational form to examine heterogeneity in responses, and indeed revealed greater heterogeneity in the focus of attention and response than earlier work has found.
In addition, we found size effects. The difference between affiliates of large and small business groups has great interest because it suggests a difference in the weight of social influence impinging on these firms. Whereas arguments on the relation between size and inertia would suggest that affiliation to a large business group would make firms less responsive to performance, we found the opposite-members affiliated to large business groups were more responsive -at least in the market domain. The likely explanation is that the internal inertial forces in the affiliates of large business groups were balanced by grouplevel forces that made the affiliate firm more responsive to performance feedback. The likely source of these changes is formal or informal comparison of performance within the business group or between each business group member and the same-industry firms. In effect, the large business groups provided the same sort of pressure towards improvements that activist shareholders give in developed economies. The low responsiveness to performance seen in unaffiliated firms suggests that this pressure is needed in order to counteract inertial forces.
We thus see both performance against aspirations and inertial forces in the model, just as both are seen in data from developed economies, and the business group organizational form alters the balance of these effects.
We predicted the differences in focus of attention and responsiveness of search based on considerations of the Indian context and the structural differences between business groups and unaffiliated firms. However, the business group organizational form bundles a number of characteristics together, which precludes attribution of the results to each characteristic individually. Thus, further investigation is needed in order to better document the mechanism behind each finding. Consider the following questions: Will multi-unit organizations always have greater responsiveness to performance feedback than single-unit organizations, or is it only when network forms of governance are applied that this happens?
Our data do not allow comparison of business group forms of governance, so this question must be left for future work. Does the focus of attention shift from R&D to market actions as firms become larger, or older, or as they become embedded in a multi-unit structure? The business group affiliates in our data were predominantly larger and older than the unaffiliated firms, so the finding could be attributed to either of these conditions, or it could be a direct result of the multi-unit structure. Data where these characteristics vary more freely are needed for exact attribution of the result to a specific mechanism. We have thus shown results consistent with our theoretical expectations, but we have not excluded alternative explanations.
Despite these caveats, our investigation has clear implications for business group research. Research on business groups in developing economies has found two major differences from corporations in the developed world. First, instead of a formalized hierarchy of ownership and control, the groups have network structures composed of multiple forms of ties, often with family ownership or cross-ownership as an important component (Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton 1991; Luo and Chung 2005; Khanna and Rivkin 2006) . Second, the emerging view is that developing economy firms tend to benefit from group affiliation (Khanna and Rivkin 2001; Keister 1998) , especially if the groups are large (Chang and Choi 1988) or diversified (Khanna and Palepu 2000) . This relationship is in contrast to standard findings in the US context that corporate diversification is a liability (e.g., Palich, Cardinal, and Miller 2000) .
Explanations for the positive performance benefit of business group affiliation range from groups substituting for missing institutions that are essential for market functioning (e.g. Leff 1978; Khanna and Palepu 1999; Chang et al. 2006 ) to groups being pyramid structures for exploiting minority shareholders (e.g. Bebchuk et al. 2000) . Research advancing these explanations usually draws indirect inferences from performance data. By shifting the focus to the behaviors of business group versus unaffiliated firms, we shed light on the origins of these performance differences. We found behavioral differences between business group affiliates and unaffiliated firms that suggest that business groups have more effective learning patterns. The differences we found are relevant to a key theoretical issue in learning models: the relation between organizational form and decision-maker attention and search patterns.
Our investigation adds to attention theory by developing hypotheses on structural effects on attention patterns, and by providing evidence that organizational structures channel the focus of attention. Such effects are suggested by earlier theoretical work and qualitative research (Ocasio 1997; Hoffman and Ocasio 2001) , but need testing. Our findings add to a recent stream of quantitative research on organizational attention that has started to incorporate measures of environmental and organizational differences (e.g., Bouquet and Birkinshaw 2008) . This work has shown that organizational attention is neither an elusive concept nor an unstable one. Organizational attention is channeled by stable structures, and its consequences for decision making can be predicted and tested empirically.
The investigation also is progress for learning theory, because it demonstrates how organizational reactions to performance feedback are affected by the organizational form.
This allows more precise understanding of the heterogeneity of firm responses to low performance, such as differential weighting of external versus internal influences on the aspiration levels and differential focus on external versus internal search. We showed that the transfer learning among business group affiliates gives a more external orientation in the direction of search, and for one of the two search outcomes (marketing search) also a more external source of aspiration levels. This matches the paths of influence among multi-unit firms that earlier have been explored mainly through intraorganizational transfer of practices (Greve 1996; Banaszak-Holl et al., 2006) and experience effects on performance and survival (Ingram and Baum 1997; Baum and Ingram 1998) . It also extends this line of work because the influence shown here is not in the adoption of specific practices, but rather in the application of a more externally oriented evaluation of own performance when judging whether the market position is satisfactory. The broad effects of organizational form that we show demonstrate the value of research on embeddedness in organizational structures and environmental contexts, and suggest a need for more work on this topic (Gavetti et al. 2007 ).
The findings suggest a potential reinterpretation of transfer learning findings. The usual theoretical rationale has been a "push" explanation where managerial attempts to transfer practices, or their sheer salience, has underpinned the prediction of transfer learning (e.g., Greve 1996; Ingram and Baum 1997) . Such theory has relatively little agency on the part of the organization that received the transfer, and does not suggest that the flow depends on (recipient) focal-organization characteristics such as its performance. The theory of problemistic search takes the opposite perspective, and instead reasons that a focal organization searches for solutions when the performance falls below aspiration levels (Cyert and March 1963) . A possible reconciliation of these theories can now be seen, because the argument of search decisions made in the focal organization is consistent with our evidence, and the evidence also indicates why transfer learning occurs when the focal organization determines the search: the search is more externally oriented when the focal organization is embedded in a multi-unit structure such as a business group. In our data this resulted in external comparisons of aspiration levels for market search; when examining organizational changes it can be seen in a greater likelihood of transfer learning.
Our theory and evidence also has implications for the theory of organizational inertia, which specified that large organizations would be less likely to change (Hannan and Freeman 1984) . There has been some findings that large organizations are less likely to change than small ones (e.g., Delacroix and Swaminathan 1991) , but an opposing finding has been obtained in performance-feedback research. When performance is below the aspiration level, large organizations are more likely to make risky investments than small ones because their size offers protection against failure (Audia and Greve 2006) . This finding suggests that the performance level should be taken into account when comparing the rates of change in small and large organizations. To that we add the observation that organizations affiliated with a larger network structure, such as business group members, are more likely to change in response to low performance. Clearly, this observation is consistent with the emphasis on power balance in the original statement of inertia theory (Hannan and Freeman 1977) , because the business group affiliation means that the focal organization owes allegiance to a larger structure that is likely to push for responsiveness to performance shortfalls.
Our study is limited in scope because it examined business groups in one nation only, and thus we need to be cautious about generalization. Indeed, much of the supporting evidence for transfer learning cited in the theory concerned not business groups or developing nations, but rather multi-unit organizations in the developed world (e.g., Ingram and Baum 1997; Banaszak-Holl et al. 2006) . This is an early investigation of how business group affiliation affects problemistic search, and much more evidence is needed. It is also important to view examination of marketing and R&D expenses as just one tool for discovering the consequences of problemistic search. Unless they are coupled with studies of organizational changes such as market entry and product launches, for example, we cannot be sure of how consequential the search is for the organization. Finally, a closer examination of concrete ties among business group firms could have yielded more precise findings of which firms influenced each other most. This study's findings are a useful starting point for future research along several paths. Perhaps the most promising direction comes from recognizing that the organizational structures and context examined here have many counterparts and variants. For example, the business group is just one of multiple organizational forms that involve a network form of governance, including many multi-unit organizations such as service chains (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Greve and Baum 2001) . Clearly it is of interest to compare findings across these organizational forms, as well as across contexts. We should expect to see some differences in their behaviors, which may help us further explore the effects of organizational form on search. The study should be a stepping stone towards extending the theory of problemistic search to include effects of structural and environmental embeddedness on the timing and direction of search. Problemistic search is an established theory with a high potential for additional work. greater than or equal to 0.01 are significant at 5% level or less b Of the 57576 firm-years of data in the sample, we lose 7288 data points on account of lagged independent variables and 5260 data points due to missing values for some of the variables leaving 45028 firm-years of data in the selection model. a The dependent variable is the extent to which Indian firms (both BG affiliated and unaffiliated firms) engage in R&D search. Only observations with non-zero dependent variable are included in the model. t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001 Two tailed tests
